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Abstract: 
Sovereign Wealth funds are public funds charged with the recycling of national wealth on 
private markets. Their swift movement from obscurity to celebrity has coincided with the 
increasing presence of other public investment machines. This has lit the tinderbox of 
suspicion and trepidation in their hosts. Nonetheless, many recipient states face an 
increasing quandary of protecting their genuine national and economic interests whilst also 
attracting the mutually profitable capital these funds provide. This capital influx has never 
been more vital, given the toxic combination of humungous debts, deficits and low saving 
rates in many recipient states.   
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Introduction:   
For much of the last century, states played an active role in markets through the interposition 
of entities for the maximisation of profit as well as the actualisation of cynical policy 
gambits. This ideology came to what is now regarded as a hiatus with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the supplanting of former economies built on statist models with the 
diametrically opposed ideology of liberal capitalism. The dawn of the new century has seen a 
number of forces collide – an increasing disposition of states to recycle their wealth abroad in 
instruments other than sovereign debt instruments, the rise of transnational normative 
frameworks for global market and business behaviour and increasing global imbalances 
which have created a widening gulf between surplus and deficit countries.1 Among the more 
visible indicators of this seismic change is the rise and rise of a new class of idiosyncratic 
investors (formally public yet functionally -private) called Sovereign wealth funds. All 
forecasts both academic and political predict an exponential growth in the size of these 
funds.2 That said, the picture is not entirely rosy. First the nature of these funds continues to 
dominate discourse in political circles, not least because of the conflation of an inherent 
sovereign status with a functionally private investment behaviour. This has created a 
revolving door of opinion about the nature of these funds, with some convinced that 
governmental nexus is the principal determinant of nature and others divided on whether the 
functional separation from the apparatus of state gives off a great deal of information these 
funds.  
                                                          
1 Larry Backer, Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulatory Chameleons: The Norwegian Wealth Funds and Public 
Global Governance Through Private Global Investments (2009) 41(2) G.J.I.L 425, 427 
2 Congressional Research Service, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Background and Policy issues for Congress, 
September 3 2008 Available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/110750.pdf  
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Second, the presence of these funds on overseas private markets has reopened long-festering 
and familiar concerns over the benefits and dangers of foreign investment, with a flooded list 
of motives ascribed to these funds. 
In search for answers to the sovereign fund conundrum, this dissertation pursues a critical 
analysis of public investments in overseas private markets. In a chronological order, the first 
chapter investigates the political economy of state capitalism and the much peddled return of 
the state. It sheds instructive light on modes of public investments in private markets ranging 
from Centrals Banks reserve management to State Corporations acquiring significant stakes 
in diverse markets. Further light is shed on the shortcomings of these corporations and their 
impacts. The analysis moves along to the reinvention of the state by way of a wealth fund. 
Here, a flashback technique is employed in tracing the history of these funds, revealing 
diverging genealogical accounts. The dissertation investigates the raison etre of creating 
SWFs,   illuminating the crucial macroeconomic and political benefits the establishment of 
these funds bring to owning states. The focus turns to the familiar definitional and structural 
conundrums besetting these funds and their investment strategies.  
The penultimate chapter explores the extant regulatory framework for sovereign wealth 
investment, examining the structural flaws embedded. Finally, a conclusion reached that a 
great deal of coordination is required to balance the protracted policy concerns of recipient 
states with the mutually beneficial investments sovereign funds bring.  
The main and last chapter is devoted to the policy concerns of recipient states vis a vis the 
market-centred investments of sovereign funds which has created a regulatory quandary. For 
this reason, the familiar concerns of national security and financial stability are probed from a 
historical perspective as well as in the context of SWFs. For a resolution of the regulatory 
quandary, proposals are  put forward, geared towards utilising existing regulatory 
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frameworks in such a way that genuine policy concerns are not shunted out, whilst also 
extracting a great deal of compromise from sovereign funds and their owners as well as 
recipient states. 
In conclusion, the dissertation calls for a laser focus on ways to achieve equilibrium between 
host states and sovereign wealth funds.  
The methodology employed is a critical analysis of the subject matter. Reliance is placed on 
research, studies, industry papers, reports, reputable newspapers and magazines, and data 
from International organizations and agencies. The final findings are based on deductions 
from a critical analysis of these sources. This paper employs a simple introduction, analysis, 
and conclusion format.    
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CHAPTER 1:- STATE CAPITALISM & PUBLIC INVESTMENTS IN OVERSEAS 
PRIVATE MARKETS 
1.0 - INTRODUCTION: 
As the cold war stumbled to an end, the ideology that governments could micro-manage 
national economies and generate prosperity became obsolete3. A neo-liberal consensus on the 
power of markets to own and control the means of production, distribution and exchange and 
the dilution of the role of the state became sage.4 After almost two decades of extensive 
statist reform and privatization, many believe the western bete noire of State Capitalism has 
made a comeback to destabilise what was thought to be a political economy set on a 
trajectory of increasingly unfettered free markets.5 To buttress this position, sceptics point to 
the growing presence of State-owned entities in private markets and the widespread 
nationalisation of private institutions during the credit and liquidity crisis.6  
Rather unsurprisingly, many observers and states view these developments with 
apprehension. The chief reason is the idea that Statist capitalism and the ideals of liberal 
capitalism are boxed in different silos. According to political scientists, the former sees the 
state as an integral part in the workings of the economy, whilst the latter is wedded to the idea 
of laissez faire markets where the role of the state is nothing but diluted. This uneasy dialectic 
between state and markets has been challenged by the reinvention of the state in quasi-private 
ways through SWFs- state-owned and controlled entities which recycle budget and/or 
commodity surpluses on private markets in search of higher premiums. The aims of these 
                                                          
3  Xu Yi-Chong, The Political Economy of Sovereign Wealth Funds (1st edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2010) p 7  
4 Suzanne Konzelmann, Anglo-Saxon Capitalism in Crisis? Models of Liberal Capitalism and the Preconditions 
For Financial Stability 2011 Centre for Business Research Working Paper N0 422 
5 A Dixon & A Monk, Rethinking the Sovereign in Sovereign Wealth Funds [2011] 37 Trans Inst Br Geogr 104 
6 Supra N 1 
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funds are usually variegated but analysts argue they are principally focused on the 
stabilization of the national balance sheet for different periods, the diversification of the 
central bank's reserves, smoothening inter-generational revenue of country, prevention of 
national socio-economic crisis and assistance of the government’s overall development 
strategy.  Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) are, therefore, hybrid entities whose nature, 
ownership and governance structure is not similar to any other public or private 
organization.7 What is intriguing about these funds is that they owe allegiance to their owners 
and constituents as entrepreneur or manager of scarce resources as well as exude a 
fundamental impulse that keeps the capitalist engine of profit and risk maximisation alive.  
In a world of economics, finance and law where everything is black and white, these colour-
coded chameleons defy belief. Similar to the debate between states and markets, a great body 
of literature has emerged questioning the motives of these funds and their ability to stabilise 
an already besieged global financial order.  
This chapter is not solely devoted to the SWF saga; it also dissects the general paradigm of 
public investments in private markets. In a chronological order it considers the concept of 
Central bank led Capitalism which involves the presence of state monetary institutions in 
Private markets. It equally, observes the increasing presence of State-owned corporations in 
private markets. The following section delves deeper into the workings of Sovereign wealth 
Funds, with instructive light shed on their definition, structure and investment strategies.            
 
 
 
                                                          
7 Chao Chen, The Theoretical Logic of Sovereign Wealth Funds, China Investment Corporation, June 16, 2009, 
Available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1420618  
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1.1 - Central Banks:-  
Since central banks were established (arguably with the establishment of the Bank of England 
in 1694) the polemics between these entities and the political system has dominated 
intellectual and political discourse. Although, the cardinal function of central banks which is 
to maintain price and monetary stability has rarely been challenged, the pendulum of 
controversies has swung from the 1980s to 90s debate about structure, institutional 
independence, inflation targeting and monetarism to the extant discourse about central bank 
complacence in the wake of the financial crisis. Yet, what remains largely hidden beneath 
routine discourse is the investments of these institutions.        
Central banks as public monetary authorities (usually independent from government) have 
gone beyond their traditional bagehotian role as lender of the last resort and also beyond their 
Keynesian or Minskyian role of ‘mopping up’ manageable debris to become traditionally 
conservative and secretive holders and managers of official reserves.8 This has coincided 
with an exponential growth in the amount of reserves held and managed by Central Banks 
across the world.  
According to the International Monetary Fund, A country’s international reserves refer to 
“...those external assets that are readily available to and controlled by monetary authorities 
for meeting balance of payments, financing needs, for intervention in exchange markets to 
affect the currency exchange rate, and for other related purposes (such as maintaining 
confidence in the currency and the economy, and serving as a basis for foreign borrowing9). 
The ownership of these reserves is subject to considerable debate. One school of thought 
contends that official reserves are owned by the government or public. On the other side, it is 
                                                          
8 Ralph Atkins, Beware Central Banks Buying Spree, Financial Times (London, 19 June 2014) Available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/460ca86a-f6fa-11e3-9e9d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3C0kX4TJA  
9 International Monetary Fund, International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity: Guidelines for a 
Template Available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/ir/IRProcessWeb/pdf/guide.pdf  
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argued that the official reserves held in a central bank may be part of the Central Bank’s 
balance sheet and thus owned by the central bank.10 Whoever formally owns the reserves, the 
reality is they are nearly always managed by the Central Bank- either as principal or in the 
case where the assets are owned by the government as agent (the main exception is where the 
reserves are part of a separate wealth investment fund) and however independent the bank is, 
the ultimate decisions on a country’s currency and the wider economy may lie with the 
Government and these decisions will of course have consequences for the management of the 
reserves.11  
For reserve managers, including central banks, there is a trilogy of objectives: Security, 
Liquidity & Returns. First, authorities will always value the security of reserves: this is 
entirely predictable as assets held on behalf of others attract a higher degree of fiduciary duty 
and safety and official reserves are no exception. Secondly, official reserves management 
must always be conducted in a way as to ensure that reserves are available as and when they 
are required. Thus, reserve management authorities will prioritize liquidity i.e. the ability to 
convert assets into cash. Thirdly, Managers of Reserves like Central Banks may try to 
maximise returns. Unlike other public reserve investment institutions like SWFs, Central 
banks generally invest in marketable, liquid and short-term instruments (although recent 
evidence discussed below suggests a radically emergent trend)12. This search for market 
premium is a fundamental impulse of capitalism which was traditionally viewed as a 
shibboleth of the private sector. Increasingly, however, such sentiments are losing steam and 
                                                          
10 John Nugee, Foreign Exchange Reserves Management, Handbooks in Central Banking no.19 Available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/Documents/ccbs/handbooks/pdf/ccbshb19.pdf    
11 Ibid  
12 J Aizemann & R Glick, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Stylized facts about their Determinants and Governance 
(2009) 12(3) International Finance 351 
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the pursuit of returns by central banks as autonomous and independent public monetary 
institutions is now a legitimate and central element of official reserves management.13         
Armed with these reserves, Central banks have been able to invest in foreign currencies like 
the dollar and gold. This investment policy serves as a lever for local currency stabilisation 
against speculative attacks. More so, Central banks recruit external managers to manage 
reserves on private markets with a view to accumulating returns on investments. According to 
the Chilean Central bank, 3% to 5% of its total investment portfolio is outsourced to external 
portfolio managers.14  
 If recent evidence is anything to go by, it is that a new form of central-bank led capitalism is 
underway with the increasing presence of the world’s central banks on private markets. 
According to a report from the Financial Times and the Official Monetary and Financial 
Institutions Forum (OMFIF), a central bank research and advisory group, banks like the 
People’s bank of China and its investment arm the China state Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE) are leading a profit maximisation and diversification drive into global 
equity markets. Whilst the SAFE has established itself as the world’s largest public sector 
holder of equities, it also appears the People’s bank of China is now itself buying minority 
equity stakes in systematically important European corporations. This interest in European 
Institutions has been derided as ‘calculated’ because it counters the monopoly of the 
American dollar and shines a light into Beijing’s global ambitions.15 The attractive 
proposition of equity investments has also caught the attention of central banks in Europe 
such as the Swiss and Danish Central banks. The former is reported to have an equity quota 
                                                          
13 Ibid at 354 
14  Banco Central De Chile, Management of Foreign Exchange Reserves at the Central Bank of Chile (2012) 
Available at http://www.bcentral.cl/eng/financial-operations/pdf/Reservemanagement2012.pdf  
15 Supra N 8  
16 
 
of about 15% worth about $500m at the end of 2013.  On a more negative note, this increased 
presence in equity markets has sparked fears of an asset price bubble.16  
Another conjuncture in Central bank led capitalism can be seen in the use of unconventional 
monetary policies which go beyond the routine lender of last resort function of Central 
Banks. A particularly illustrative example is bout of Quantitative easing injected by western 
Central banks in the wake of the Financial Crisis. This involved injecting liquidity and 
stimulating domestic economies, not by cutting interest rates but by purchasing financial 
assets directly from banks and financial institutions (private markets) through the creation of 
bank reserves/ money. In the immediate aftermath of Lehman Brothers collapse, International 
Banks stopped trusting each other as the inter-bank lending markets became toxic. 
Consequently, the Federal Reserve upped its commercial paper and asset-backed commercial 
paper purchase to restore financial stability. This capital injection strategy was followed by 
the Bank of England and the European Central Bank whose coverage extended from 
government gilts to corporate bonds and other financial instruments. As the crisis deepened, 
so did the depth of Central bank Balance sheets. According to IMF Statistics, the Balance 
sheets of the Fed and the BOE more than tripled between July 2007 and January 2012 from 
approximately 5% of GDP to about 20% of GDP. Over the same period, the ECB 
experienced an exponential growth in its asset and liabilities base from 12.5% of GDP to 32% 
of GDP.17 In effect, Central bank Balance sheets became not only bloated but riskier, calling 
into question the notion that central banks place greater weight on holding safer assets.18  
                                                          
16 ibid 
17 International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report 4 (2012), Available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/FT/GFSR/2012/01/pdf/text.pdf.  
18 A. Bowman, I. Erturk, J Froud, S Johal, A Leaver, M Moran & K Williams, Central Bank Led Capitalism, (2013) 
36(2) Seattle. U. L.R 455, 472, , See also http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-
explains/2014/01/economist-explains-7  
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The responses to these unconventional policies remain evenly balanced with some attributing 
the slow but steady recovery to the magnitude of these policy innovations19 and others 
questioning the wisdom of a central monetary authority holding stockpiles of bought-in assets 
which could create exit problems and low yields. Yet, what is clear is that these assets bought 
by central banks can be sold to return balance sheets to pre-crisis levels, with considerable 
yield for the central banks involved.20     
 
1.2-  STATE-OWNED CORPORATIONS 
State-owned corporations are an archetypical mode of public investments in the private 
sector. These entities are usually incorporated by an enactment of the state legislature or 
parliament. They are also powered by public resources which sometimes give them market 
leverage over private competitors. Furthermore, the phenomena of ownership and control 
rests on the home state save in circumstances where the corporation in question is publicly 
listed. In the latter case, the state or its emanation is usually the majority shareholder 
followed by other shareholders. Control of these entities can be done directly or indirectly 
through the appointment of professional or political figure heads as directors and managers. 
State-owned corporations may take the form of Multinational or Transnational corporations 
engaged in direct investment outside its home country or similar arrangements may be set up 
involving the acquisition of stakes in other corporations.21 
Years after the coup de grace of the Soviet Union, the retreat of state-owned corporations and 
the enthronement of the free and unfettered markets doctrine, state capitalism seems to have 
                                                          
19 Martin Wolf, Lunch with the FT: Paul Krugman, Financial Times (London , May 26, 2012), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/022acf50-a4d1-11e1-9a94-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2FLp6o2gy  
20 Supra N 18 
21 C.D. Wallace, The Multinational Enterprise and Legal Control: Host State Sovereignty in an Era of Economic 
Globalization (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoof Publishers, 2002) p.9 
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launched a remarkable comeback.22 In a world where the tides of economic development and 
growth has swung from west to east and even south, struggling recipient economies 
increasingly depend on a capital influx from private and public investors. With the private 
sector recovering from a protracted credit, liquidity and confidence crisis, the lot has fallen on 
powerful state-owned entities, many of which are pre-disposed towards statist models of 
economic development. As such, hundreds and possibly thousands of state-owned 
corporations are acquiring stakes not just in domestic markets but also overseas. In sectors as 
diverse as energy, defence, power generation, telecoms, aviation and financial services, these 
corporations are setting the pace through the proliferation of subsidiaries and the acquisition 
of stakes in moribund companies. In the energy sector for instance, State-owned oil 
corporations have dislodged the so-called seven sisters. According to Forbes’ 2013 
statistics23, 7 of the top 10 international oil companies are state-owned and in chronological 
order they are; Saudi Aramco, Gazprom, National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), Rosneft, 
PetroChina, Pemex and the Kuwaiti Petroleum Company.  Cumulatively, these companies 
control over 3-quarters of the world’s energy reserves and have revenues larger than some 
countries. In contrast, the private oil companies on the list produce just about 10% of the 
world’s oil and gas and hold about 3% of its reserves.24 The tale of public investments in 
private markets is not just an oil story; there are also significant statist footprints in a broad 
range of sectoral markets. In the metals and steels industry, Chinese and Russian metallurgy 
corporations are throwing sharp elbows in the competition for market share in Africa.25 In the 
utilities sector, the State-Grid Corporation of China is flexing its financial muscle in Europe 
                                                          
22 The State Advances, The Economist (October 6th 2012) Available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21564274  
23Christopher Helman, The World’s Biggest Oil Companies,  Forbes (November 17th 2013) 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2013/11/17/the-worlds-biggest-oil-companies-2013/   
24 Ian Bremmer The Return of State Capitalism, (2008) 50 (3) Survival 55, 57 
25 China and South Africa Sign Business Deals, Wall St J ((August 25th 2010) 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703447004575448911926722310  
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through the acquisition of significant stakes in European Grid networks.26 Moreso, The 
French government retains an 85% percent majority stake in Electricite de France (EDF) 
which is a household name in the European utilities markets.  In mining, Russian mining 
corporations like Ruschrome are investing over $ 1.6 billion in platinum mining in East 
Africa.27 The list extends into infrastructure where Chinese corporations are investing in 
African and western roads and railways.28 In financial services, Corporations from China and 
the United Arab Emirates have been acquiring significant stakes in banks. According to a 
report from the Wall Street Journal, the China Development Bank, a Chinese government 
controlled corporation acquired a 3.1% stake in Barclays a British bank.29 In the tobacco 
industry, Japan tobacco which controls over 66.4% of Japan’s tobacco production, continues 
to broaden its international reach through the acquisition of key tobacco and pharmaceutical 
corporations across the world.30           
Despite mutually profitable benefits, these public footprints in private markets pose enormous 
difficulties. First, in a multipolar world where interests constantly evolve, state-owned 
corporations may lurch from purely commercial activities to political activities. This is 
particularly so where the home state itself has a different philosophical orientation of the role 
of the state, here, Russia and China come to mind. Secondly, State-owned corporations like 
their privately-owned counterparts may become massive exporters of harm. This is 
potentially tricky given the acutely scrupulous corporate social responsibility crusade 
launched by academics, international organisations, non-governmental institutions and host 
                                                          
26 China State Grid quietly builds Méditerranéen network, Reuters (August 10, 2014) 
  http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/08/10/utilities-mediterranean-china-idUKL6N0QB5NF20140810  
27 Zimbabwe-Russia Joint-Venture to invest $1.6 Billion in Platinum Mine, Moscow Times (August 5th 2014) 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/zimbabwe-russia-joint-venture-to-invest-1-6bln-in-
platinum-mine/504608.html   
28 Kathlene Caulderwood, Chinese Money diverted away from Oil towards other Sectors, I.B Times (May 15, 
2014) http://www.ibtimes.com/chinese-money-africa-directed-away-oil-toward-other-sectors-1584805  
29 E Curran & D McMahon, Barclays, China Development Bank ink new Pact, Wall St J( March 26, 2014) 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303949704579462101918756012  
30 Kingsley Moghalu, Emerging Africa: How the Global Economy’s Last Frontier can Prosper and Matter (1st edn, 
Penguin Books 2014) 51 
20 
 
states. If anything, an irresponsible action by a state-owned corporation in the territory of 
another state may ignite diplomatic, social and legal problems. Thirdly, questions can be 
asked about the rationality of concentrating strategic industries like energy in the clutches of 
state-owned Corporations that are often plagued with bureaucracy, profligacy and political 
cronyism. In the words of Ian Bremmer, this trend poses mammoth risks for consumers of 
energy end- products and even importing states.31 As we can see from the ongoing Ukrainian 
crisis, State-owned corporations and the commodities they produce or distribute can be used 
as political weapons and foreign policy tools with immeasurable costs to consumers.32 
Finally, the political leverage and revenue generated by state corporations can embolden 
recalcitrant states to pursue reckless and bellicose foreign policy gambits, secure in the 
knowledge that there will be little or no international pressure. A recent and ongoing example 
is the obduracy of European states to back hard-hitting sanctions against the Russian 
Federation and its emanations like Gazprom for the invasion and annexation of parts of 
Ukraine. These European states were held back due to their inordinate reliance on Russian 
Gas and threats from corporations like Gazprom to turn off the taps.33  
Whether or not the state went away or whether the state has rebounded continues to fuel 
animated discourse. This is further investigated in the next section.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31 Supra N 24  
32 Ukraine Crisis : Russia Halts Gas Supplies to Kiev  BBC ( June 16th 2014) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
europe-27862849  
33 ibid 
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1.3 - Sovereign Wealth Funds:  
Years after John Maynard Keynes’ prescient idea about getting deficit and surplus countries 
together to foster global stability, a new perspective as well as new class of surplus investor 
has emerged. The perspective is that of increasing capital mobility from the former net 
importers of the East and South to the former net exporters of the west. The new class of 
surplus investors are Sovereign Wealth Funds.34 These funds are best understood as a genus 
of national investment vehicles or public repositories of wealth.   
Armed with a war-chest of fiscal surpluses and rising commodity receipts, these state-owned 
funds have taken advantage of an economic climate defined by burgeoning commodity 
prices, record deficits, massive stockpiles of foreign exchange reserves, global imbalances, 
and a stability crisis.  In the past, surplus country holdings took the form of central bank 
purchases of U.S Treasury & agency securities. Over time, investments into less liquid and 
riskier assets emerged as did new institutional forms. The reinvention of the state into this 
kind of quasi-private and hybrid form continues to be viewed as a rude awakening, not least 
because of the traditional skirmish between market and state capitalism and long festering 
policy arguments against opening the floodgates of foreign investments. Sovereign Wealth 
Funds not only challenge this skirmish, their very nature conflates the ideals of the duo. 
Intriguingly, these funds are public, yet they display the fundamental capitalist impulse of 
risk diversification and profit maximisation, through organised and targeted interventions in 
private markets.35 Although their progenitors (Central Banks) displayed this kind of impulse 
by pursuing conservative and safe investments in liquid securities, they seldom showed the 
low aversion to risk that Sovereign funds reveal on an almost day to day basis in market 
transactions.  The functions of these funds are variegated, however, their crucial roles include 
                                                          
34 Anna Gelpern, Sovereignty, Accountability and the Wealth Fund Governance Conundrum (2011)  Available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1639119       
35 ibid 
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the recycling of fiscal surpluses and commodity receipts, stabilisation of the national balance 
sheet for different periods, diversification of the central bank’s reserves, smoothening inter-
generational revenue, hedging against procyclical periods and the assistance of the 
government’s developmental strategy.36 Of all instruments of state capitalism, these funds 
have dominated international headlines in recent years, not least because of a sharp spike in 
number, the amount of capital at their disposal, its very nature as government-owned and a 
rapid rise from obscurity to celebrity.37 Having introduced this new sect of international 
investors, it is important to flashback to their history as well as investigate the increasing 
attractiveness of this form of public investment.  
 
1.3 (a)- History and Concept of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Sovereign Wealth Funds are not new entities. In fact, modern accounts of their existence 
suggest that the Kuwaiti Investment Authority established in 1953 to invest its surpluses was 
the world’s first Sovereign Wealth Fund. However earlier reports trace the origin of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds to 1816 when France created the Caisse des Depots et 
Consignations (CDC) to manage government and overseas tax-exempt funds collected by 
French savings banks and post offices.38 Following the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, 
emerging economies began accumulating reserves cushions; this trend was wired by high 
commodity prices and huge United States demand. This has led to a shift in the economic 
centre of gravity from the traditional big players of the west to emerging markets in Asia and 
commodity-rich countries in the Gulf and Africa and an exponential rise of funds from newly 
exporting states.  
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The concept of Sovereign wealth funds has become an attractive proposition for resource-rich 
countries and countries with large amounts of official reserves. With global markets volatile 
and the direction of commodity prices shrouded in uncertainty, more and more countries are 
joining the clamour to establish Sovereign Wealth funds. But is this enthusiasm justified?  
Not many will dispute that it is politically and economically prudent for governments to save 
for the rainy day. By establishing a Sovereign wealth fund, Governments can use draw-
downs to pay up for pension black holes, cushion the domestic economy from future price 
and economic shocks and ensure future generations benefit from the extraction of finite 
resources.39 For commodity- exporting countries, the establishment of these funds is 
advisable, not least to insulate against cyclical inflationary trends. This is as a result of a lot 
of foreign currency exposure into the domestic economy, which could be due to payments for 
exports of commodities or other goods and services. Unless a preponderance of this money is 
not spent on locally manufactured products, this could boost domestic demand and cause the 
economy to heat up if it does not have the capacity to meet the amplified demand.40 
Therefore, by establishing a sovereign wealth fund, the foreign currency inflows instead of 
being converted into local currency and spent, can be kept in its original form and invested 
abroad for returns41.  
Again, most countries suffer from what is called the ‘Dutch Disease’ which occurs when a 
country experiences a massive increase in resource exportation that diminishes 
industrialization and diversification. With finite fossil fuels that are non-renewable, most 
resource-rich states remain inordinately reliant on proceeds from resource exportation 
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without diversifying into manufacturing or other alternative livelihoods.42 An increasingly 
sensible way of preventing this plague and diversifying national wealth is to accumulate the 
commodity-driven wealth and invest it overseas for returns. The rapid inflow of foreign 
currency also affects local currencies by appreciating it and consequently damaging the 
competitiveness of export-reliant sectors like manufacturing. The panacea again is to hold 
wealth in the original form of the foreign exchange, rather than convert it to local currency. 
By so doing, the wealth in its foreign currency form can be invested overseas for returns 
through a fund.43 The political and economic attractiveness of sovereign wealth funds can 
also be seen in developmental strategy. Here, funds may be established to pursue market 
premiums abroad which will in turn be utilized in the home country’s developmental strategy.  
Moving away from core macroeconomics, Countries also set up Sovereign Funds to pursue 
Strategic motivations for foreign policy and developmental goals. Simply put, Sovereign 
funds are endogenously modelled machines tasked with the pursuit of exogenous power and 
influence through the transfer and maximisation of the state’s proprietary assets. This is 
particularly so, given the commingling of global economic power and global political power. 
Therefore, countries with unmistakably ambitious motives, armed with a war chest of foreign 
exchange reserves, commodity receipts and fiscal surpluses can set up Sovereign Wealth 
Funds to pursue mercantilist or strategic goals with a view to transforming the leverage 
obtained into genuine political power and influence. 44    
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1.3 b- Definitional Challenges, Nature and Structure of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Like much else about Sovereign wealth funds, there is little consensus on a definition. The 
differences in definition reflects the ambiguity of the instrument itself- to some government 
owned, to others public but nongovernmental and to a third category, formally sovereign yet 
functionally private. Underlying the ambiguities and the means to overcome them is a loyalty 
to a strict dichotomy between public and private law and actors.45 It is this combination of 
fidelity to the public/ private divide combined with the assumptions about the nature of 
sovereign funds that serves as the footing for regulatory approaches. 
The search for a definition for Sovereign Wealth Funds began after 2005 when Andrew 
Rozanov an economist with a private investment firm coined the phrase Sovereign Wealth 
Fund.46 According to Rozanov, these funds were neither traditional pension funds nor 
traditional reserve assets supporting national currencies. Instead, they are pool of funds 
managed separately under guidelines distinct from those applicable to central bank reserves, 
to achieve more broadly diversified and risk-tolerant sovereign wealth.47 This definition 
sparked a revolving door of opinions from academics, policymakers, the business community 
and institutions.  For academics, SWFs are a pool of domestic assets owned and managed by 
governments to achieve a variety of economic and financial objectives, including the 
accumulation and management of reserve assets, the stabilisation of macroeconomic effects 
and the transfer of wealth across generations.48   
To policymakers like Mr. Clay Lowery, (a former Assistant secretary in the United States 
Treasury), SWFs are government investment vehicles, funded by foreign exchange assets, 
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and which manages these assets separately from official reserves”.  To him, there are five 
ingredients that characterise sovereign wealth funds: Sovereign; High foreign currency 
exposure; No explicit liabilities; High risk tolerance; Long investment horizon. 
To the business community, sovereign meant autonomous, somewhat insulated from market 
pressures, and therefore freer to take long risks.49 To institutions like the International 
Monetary Fund, Sovereign Wealth Funds are government-owned investment funds, set up for 
a variety of macroeconomic purposes, commonly funded by the transfer of foreign exchange 
assets that are invested long-term overseas.50  Although, this troika of definitions follow 
different paths, they find common ground on the subjective characteristic of public ownership 
and management and the objective element of sovereign fund activities and purposes.  
Sovereign funds are idiosyncratic institutions with traits similar to other institutions like 
Official reserves and pension funds. These three categories of public funds have different 
characteristics, but are not necessarily mutually exclusive. There could be some overlap 
between SWFs and Pension Funds. The best example is Singapore’s GIC. But even Norway’s 
GPF could be another example. On the overlap with Central Banks, some authors have 
argued that some sovereign funds as we know it began as official reserves.51 That said, there 
are divergences. Unlike official reserves managed by Central banks, Sovereign Wealth Funds 
and Pension funds tend invest in riskier assets as well as stay long term in markets. Unlike 
pension funds; Sovereign wealth funds do not have specific future liabilities.   
From forays into thin thickets of definition above, it is possible to discern an assumption 
shared about sovereign wealth funds - The assumption of public ownership. As seen above, 
many see sovereign funds as government-owned. However credible such a position is, it runs 
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the risk of over-simplifying an intricate creature. In a modern state, sovereign power can 
create legal personalities such as “corporations”, “state agencies” and “departments” which 
belong either to the public or private law domains. That said, there is arguably a discrete 
category of legal personalities which is public and yet non-governmental. Such entities are 
called “nongovernmental public bodies.” they include state pension funds, central banks and 
securities regulators which are not part of the conventional apparatus of state but still perform 
public functions. Sovereign funds can pass for such bodies by virtue of their management and 
investment of public funds and their marked separation from the apparatus of government.  
Another view often espoused is that sovereign wealth funds are formally public but 
functionally private.52 This view reflects a growing perspective that sovereign wealth funds 
are a manifestation of new forms of public/private conflation through instrumentalities and 
actions that are neither fish nor fowl.53  In effect, they are funds controlled by states as 
fiduciary for the greater or ultimate owners (citizens) but involved in making inroads into 
private markets. To complicate matters further, SWFs are not consistently treated as either 
public or private entities. The United States for example treats them as public for tax 
purposes, yet as private bodies for immunity purposes and as a foreign investor.  
Unlike a private legal personality whose structure and governance is defined in the company 
laws and articles of associations of a company, the structure and governance of SWFs is not 
set in stone. Some Sovereign funds are normally established through a piece of legislation. 
Whilst others rely on company law rules to fill some organizational gaps. This cloud of 
structural uncertainty serves to illustrate how enigmatic sovereign wealth funds are. 
As mentioned before there has been no clear and straightforward view on the definition of 
SWFs. There is also no consensus on the nature, the structure, ownership and governance of 
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SWFs. In a world built around the twin silos of public and private, these funds represent an 
assault on the traditional public-private divide.  Their hybrid nature has demolished the long-
standing assumption that private and public actors are distinct. Yet, they cannot wholly 
escape their chameleonic character as sovereigns and quasi-private entities engaged in private 
markets. 
 
 
1.4- Investments and Strategies of Sovereign Wealth Funds. 
The portfolios of Sovereign wealth funds are made up of securities both equity and debt, and 
other sophisticated financial instruments such as derivatives. If recent evidence is anything to 
go by, these funds are also investing in Real Estate, infrastructure both domestically and 
transnationally and in Agriculture.54 Evidence also suggests that these funds are passive 
investors who typically do not purchase more than 10% of the capital stock of corporations. 
That said, there has been recent evidence of Sovereign wealth funds showing increased 
shareholder activism in the election of the management of investee corporations.55 These 
funds also favour buy and hold strategies on private markets. An instructive example is the 
failure of many sovereign funds to branch out of western capital markets during the financial 
crisis. Sovereign Funds also show a low aversion to risk.  
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Conclusion: 
This chapter elaborated on the public money in overseas private markets paradigm. Drawing 
from a wide range of evidence, it revealed that Central Banks as Public Monetary Authorities 
separate from governments increasingly patrol capital markets in search of risk-adjusted 
returns. The same goes for State-owned corporations, albeit with significant concerns.  Yet, 
the most publicised ‘indicators’ of the state’s ‘rebound’ are SWFs. It was established that 
these funds defy the traditional black and white view of the world, with their colour-coded 
chameleonic nature. Also established was the lack of consensus on the definition and 
structure of these funds. The raison etre for their creation was examined, revealing a raft of 
macroeconomic benefits associated with these funds. Further analysis investigated their 
investment strategies, which have thus far proved benign. Yet, a great deal of fear has ensued 
in overseas markets, leading to an increasingly acrimonious regulatory debate, where SWFs 
are entrapped between regulation and politics. The next chapter dissects this regulatory 
debate and the framework underpinning SWF investments.       
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CHAPTER 2:-  
THE EXTANT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND 
INVESTMENT 
2.1- Sponsoring Countries Laws and Oversight Networks 
The regulation of investment by SWFs is certainly an important policy objective of the home 
country. From the inception of the investment fund, there are almost always regulatory limits 
on the nature, percentages, issuing company and the country of the origin of the securities in 
which SWFs could invest. In fact, the fund itself is almost always underpinned by way of a 
constitutional statute.56 
Home state regulation also extends to levels of public law oversight in form of executive or 
parliamentary oversight. For example in Singapore, the appointment and removal of members 
of the board of the country’s two Sovereign Wealth Funds requires the assent of the country’s 
executive.  More so, the financial reports and proposed budgets of these funds must also be 
submitted to the executive for its imprimatur and finally, the executive is constitutionally 
entitled to any information concerning the country’s sovereign wealth funds.57 In the 
Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority Act, powers to appoint the members of the fund’s 
board of directors is reserved for the Nigerian executive.58 Equally, the funding formula and 
investment targets of the Nigerian fund is enshrined in statute to ensure the smooth 
                                                          
56 Yvonne, Lee The Reversal of Neo-Colonialism: The Pitfalls and Prospects of Sovereign Wealth Funds (2009) 
40 Geo. J. Int’l L. 1103 at  1121 
57  ibid 
58 Section 16 (2) Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority Act  
31 
 
disbursement of public money to the Sovereign wealth Fund.59 This blend of executive and 
parliamentary oversight, as well as the funding structure of many funds will raise perennial 
questions about the political independence of these funds.  Moving on, some SWFs are also 
subject to home state regimes of accountability, transparency and disclosure.60  
Certain SWFs have now been mandated by home state laws to pursue investments that 
comply with environmental, human rights and ethical concerns in their investments. Norway 
provides an instructive example, where the country’s SWF (Government Pension Fund 
Global) has been mandated to adopt environment-friendly and ethical investments which are 
closely scrutinised by the Norges Bank. That said, the efficacy test for this kind of oversight 
arrangement is always in its implementation. In the Norwegian case, the SWF continues to 
acquire international investment clout because of its scrupulous adherence to corporate 
governance standards and its green and ethical investments which has seen it divest stakes in 
many corporations.61    
2.2- European Union Approach to Third Country Sovereign Wealth Funds 
The most recent evidence of European Union Policy on Sovereign wealth funds can be found 
in the European Commission’s Specific communication entitled ‘A common European 
approach to Sovereign Wealth Funds.’ This intervention came arguably as a result of Member 
states action pursuant to article 65 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union to 
limit the flow of inward investments from third country sovereign wealth funds. In the 
Communication, the European Union Commission set out its case for a common EU 
approach as well as its direction of travel on Sovereign fund issues.62 Although this text is of 
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little legal significance, it underscores five cardinal principles. First, the EU affirmed its 
commitment to an open investment environment,  it also avowed its support for Multilateral 
work with organisations like the OECD and IMF on SWFs. Thirdly, the EU accentuated the 
presence of an existing legal framework to enable member states respond efficaciously to the 
risks posed by SWFs, it also called on Member states to respond in ways harmonious with the 
EU treaty obligations and international commitments and finally to do so in a proportional 
and transparent manner.  
The absence of hard rules and regulations from the European Union has prompted 
suggestions that the EU Commission views the issue of SWFs as a matter of economic 
governance and is therefore not in the mood to tame these funds.63 However credible this 
position is, it is worth noting that the European Union is armed with a loaded arsenal of treaty 
weapons which allows it to make legislative interventions within its balance of competence. 
Therefore, any suspicion that SWF investments are seriously disruptive to the proper 
functioning of the internal market may trigger a robust response from the European Union. 
However, this may not go down without a scuffle with the more capital libertarian member 
states. 
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2.3- OECD Regulations 
Multilateral institutions like the OECD have also been involved in the articulating regulatory 
frameworks for Sovereign Wealth funds. In its maiden report on SWF investment,64  the 1961 
(amended 2010) OECD Code on Liberalisation of capital movements, the principle of 
National treatment provided for in the 1976 Declaration on International investments and 
Multinational companies (amended in 2000) and its guidelines on corporate governance for 
state-owned entities were said to apply to SWFs. These OECD measure call inter alia for 
non-discrimination to foreign investments, transparency and disclosure, non-protectionism, 
and the progressive liberalisation and the gradual elimination of capital movement 
restrictions.  
The OECD went further in 2008 to issue a declaration on SWFs and recipient countries 
policies.65 This declaration reflects established OECD commitments on the progressive 
liberalisation of trade and investments. It contains commitments on non-protectionism, non-
discrimination among investors in like circumstances, progressive liberalisation save in cases 
of legitimate national security concerns and also calls on national governments to adopt 
legislative measures that are transparent, proportional to clearly defined security risks and 
subject to accountable application.  Although the OECD has rarely acquired the reputation of 
a toothless talking shop, its measures suffer from acute implementation problems especially 
from non-member countries. More so, legitimate questions can be asked about whether 
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capital exporting countries outside the conventional OECD bloc consider themselves part of 
the traditional OECD community. 
 
2.4 Santiago principles 
The protection of Sovereign wealth funds’ investments and host states vital national and 
economic interest are two sides of the same coin. In a quest to coordinate these competing 
interests, International soft law institutions have formulated non-binding principles and 
standards. An authoritative example is the Santiago Generally Accepted Principles and 
Practices (GAAPs) produced by the IMF in conjunction with several SWFs commonly 
known as the International Working Group. The so-called Santiago principles contains a far-
reaching definition of Sovereign Wealth Funds and establishes a voluntary framework of 24 
behavioural standards on operational independence in investment decisions, risk 
management, transparency, disclosure and accountability.  
In principle, the voluntary standards enshrined in the Santiago Principles and which lie at the 
heart of the IWG’s work is laudable. As a venerable first step, they provide an important 
international environment within which stricter global standards can be fashioned and 
endorsed. Secondly, the principles rightly prioritise transparency and the improvement of 
information flows, which represents the basis upon which investors and other market 
counterparties, as "rational actors", base assessments about the arrangements into which they 
enter. Thirdly, by rejecting a one-size-fits all model of regulation, the principles can be 
adapted to suit the needs of individual SWFs irrespective of their size, organisational 
structure, or investment objectives. An added advantage in this respect is that the approach is 
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sufficiently "dynamic" to be capable of responding to changing global circumstances66.  Yet 
the reliance on a voluntary framework is in itself problematic. First, the adoption of principles 
raises questions regarding the appropriateness of self-regulation for such powerful actors. 
Secondly, the principles in question have been drawn up with high level generality and 
breadth making it likely that they are a mere compromise.67 Thirdly, they are entirely 
voluntary, meaning that enforcement action cannot be taken in the event of non-compliance. 
In terms of disclosure, most principles require adherence to the disclosure requirements of 
host and home states, but fail to say what kind of information should be disclosed, how and 
when, meaning that problems are nevertheless sure to remain, not least because of the highly 
complex nature of the many financial products that SWFs trade and the markets in which 
they operate, as well as the proprietary nature of their trading strategies and investment 
policies, the rapidity of their market positions, and the lack of repeat dealings with 
counterparties68 . Fourth, there is no auditing body to monitor compliance with the principles 
even by those states that have declared their intention to adopt them. The fifth concern relates 
to the requirement for SWFs to disclose investment decisions that are subject to 
considerations other than economic and financial ones.  Here, it is difficult to see how funds 
are incentivised to disclose such information and even if such intentions are present, it is 
difficult to see how funds will state them beforehand and how aggrieved host states can prove 
these considerations ex-post.69  
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2.5 Host Country Regulations: 
With markets still recovering from the greatest economic crisis in modern history, so also has 
regulation emerged as an attractive tool to police the insidiousness of self-reinforcing 
markets.  Regulators haunted by the hard lessons of a less vigilant past have begun to utilize 
statist power to police and protect domestic economies from the threat of instability. In the 
wake of this reinforcement, Sovereign wealth funds appear to be entrapped. Many recipient 
states candidly admit the stabilising role these funds play and can play but are increasingly 
petrified of the insidious effects of a free rein in domestic markets70. Top of the concern is 
that these funds are symptomatic of a wider malaise in which instruments of globalisation can 
be utilised strategically, with humungous consequences for National and Economic security. 
(These risks are investigated in the next chapter). Another concern iteratively revealed is that 
sovereign wealth funds represent a new contradiction between statist and liberal ideologies of 
international political economy.71  
Till date, the accusations of nefariousness are yet to be substantiated. On the contrary, 
sovereign funds played a benign role in salvaging systematically important institutions during 
the financial crisis with huge haemorrhage to their portfolios.72 In spite of all these, a 
regulatory avalanche has ensued in many recipient states. The litmus test for this regulatory 
intervention is not just about addressing market failure, it is also about striking a balance 
between the long festering policy concerns of recipient states and an investment regime 
which does not read ‘closed for business.’ In effect, regulatory interventions must and should 
be balanced, proportionate and tailored to clearly defined risks as opposed to protectionist 
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and restrictive. In the context of sovereign wealth funds, there are genuine concerns that 
many extant regulatory policies do not satisfy the afore-mentioned test.73  
Generally, The Regulation of SWFs from the perspective of Host states follows two 
dimensions, the first is Market- access and the second is post-entry. These are analysed 
below.     
 
 
2.5(a)- Market-Access Regulation:-   
These restrictions consist of two types of measures before SWFs enter into the market. Some 
countries have adopted a general prohibition of foreign stake-holdings in domestic 
corporations above a specified threshold percentage. For example, SWFs are prohibited from 
buying more than 5% of individual Italian companies.74  Whilst this provision applies more to 
third country SWFs in lieu of those from European Union member states where such a rule is 
likely to breach EU treaty provisions on freedom of capital and establishment, it is likely to 
put off SWF investors and further stifle the availability of ready capital in failing economies 
such as the Italian economy.75 Another form of market access regulation is the review of 
foreign investment now applied across many recipient countries from the United States to 
countries like Germany, Australia and china.  
In the United States, the Committee on Foreign Investments is charged with the responsibility 
of screening covered foreign investments transactions to source out national security dangers.  
The remit of this committee originally did not capture SWF investment because in most cases 
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the latter refrained from taking controlling stakes in companies and investing in shares above 
10 percent of the capital stock. In response to this lacuna, the US Congress enacted the 2007 
Foreign Investment and National Security Act (FINSA) and consequently broadened the 
remit of this committee and increased congressional oversight. Under the new rule, the 
president is authorised to block foreign investments that might impair national security.76 
Similar processes are applicable in Germany, Australia, Canada, China, Russia and Japan just 
to mention a few.77  
On the other side of the Atlantic, Britain favours a libertarian approach to SWF investment. 
According to Mark Thatcher, policy-makers view inward SWF investment as a vital national 
interest.78 This economic governance approach has often been conflated with light-touch 
regulation of Foreign Investment. As such, a growing xenophobic movement has seized the 
initiative. Flashpoints include the botched Pfizer takeover of Astra Zeneca. This was met with 
repeated calls from both sides of the political divide for the broadening of the slim public 
interest test in the Enterprises Act 2002 and increased governmental policing of strategic 
industries like Research, Development and Sciences. This could have an impact on sovereign 
wealth investments.     
In many cases, these policy interventions are tailored to genuinely conceived risks, yet they 
could be more counter-productive than initially thought. First, it emits a hypocritical reek 
given that the now-protectionist economies sold the trade liberalisation dogma to the new 
capital exporters in the heydays of market liberalism. Secondly, such policies run the risk of 
creating perceptions in home countries that sovereign investments are unwelcome and with 
the arbitrage opportunities presented in emerging economies, Sovereign funds could be 
tempted to shift their capital flows there. In fact, the Wall street Journal recently reported the 
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frustrations of the head of the China Investment Corporation Gao Xiqing where he lamented 
the hostile nature of the American investment regime.79 That said, Regulators as market 
umpires should engage in a cost-benefit analysis of the capital Sovereign Funds provide. 
They must also take cognisance of the inharmonious interests between national policies and 
the yearnings of recipient corporations, many of whom are suffering from low capital buffers. 
As such, a way must be found to make sure that regulatory interventions on market access do 
not suffocate the macroeconomic benefits these capital inject.     
2.5 (b)- Post-Entry Regulations  
The regulatory avalanche facing sovereign wealth funds does not stop at the borders of 
recipient countries; it also applies after their investments have crossed recipient frontiers. For 
example, it is routine for competition laws to target the investments of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds given the likelihood for anti-competitive commercial strategies, the creation of market 
dominance and the erection of barriers to preclude entry of more efficient rivals in the 
market. A recent example is the dispute between the Indonesian anti-competition watchdog 
(KPPU) over the Temasek shareholding in Indosat (a telecommunications corporation). This 
resulted in the SWF having to dispose its 40.8% stake to Qater Telecom for US.$ 1.8 
Billion80.   
Given that Sovereign Wealth Funds invest primarily in corporate and public securities, they 
also have to comply with Securities Regulations on insider trading, fraud, and disclosure in to 
create a level-playing field between investors. For example, in the United States, once a 
Sovereign Wealth Funds position exceeds 5% of shares in a publicly-traded Corporation, it 
                                                          
79 Andrew Browne and Lingling Wei, China Fund Chief Raps US, Wall St. J. (Apr. 7, 2013) Available at 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323820304578408512159425892  
80 Qatar Telecom to Pay $2.4 Billion for Indosat Stake, Bloomberg Online, Jun. 7, 2008 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=aQ9BG.Aj.KP0&pid=newsarchive  
40 
 
must comply with reporting requirements by way of a Schedule 13D filing.81 Greater 
percentage holdings equally trigger greater reporting requirements.82 In effect, this alerts 
gatekeepers and other investors to the size of SWFs’ interest.  Furthermore, non-compliance 
with these securities regulations could result in public and private litigations against 
sovereign wealth funds, potentially triggering tensions between home and host countries. 
Although the American Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) provides immunity for the 
instrumentalities of foreign states from taxation and suits in American courts, this immunity 
does not preclude suits like the above involving SWFs commercial activities.83   
Conclusion 
Whilst there are conceivable risks associated with sovereign wealth funds, they have till date 
been nothing but market stabilisers. The macroeconomic benefits of these funds cannot be 
overemphasised, yet many recipient states have long feared the risks associated with foreign 
investments. That said, there is the important need to strike a balance between these cardinal 
considerations in ways which will not drown out sovereign investments or the national or 
economic security of host states. Proposals to bridge this gap are analysed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3:- THE DILEMMA OF RECONCILING THE NEED FOR SOVEREIGN 
WEALTH INVESTMENTS AND THE POLICY CONCERNS LIMITING SUCH 
INVESTMENTS  
3.0- Introduction: 
An apparition continues to follow recipient countries of a type of fund that supposedly buys 
strategic resources around the world, hollows out companies, gorges up financial institutions 
and threatens the sovereignty of the countries in whose resources and companies it invests. It 
is the spectre of Sovereign Wealth Funds- government-sponsored and controlled investment 
vehicles widely derided by the most savage critics as the Trojan Horses and bogeymen of 
global finance.84 Although many concerns ascribed to SWFs have proved premature, and 
unsubstantiated, recipient countries are still haunted by the fear the unknown, leading to a 
precipitous slide towards Naked Protectionism.85  
Much has been made of the slide towards naked protectionism but little time and space has 
been devoted to reasons for this. First, there is a growing unease in Western recipient states of 
an anti-western capital surge from certain countries classed as political risks.86 If anything, 
the political grandstanding in the United States Congress in the wake of the Botched Dubai 
Ports-World sale lends credence to this position. Also, there seems to be a burgeoning 
nationalist sentiment against the acquisition of strategic industries especially by statist and 
foreign actors and this is not a preserve of any one geographical location. All these meshed 
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together runs the risk of reducing the current foreign investment regime from a liberal process 
of capital flows to a mere profiling exercise which could in the long run prove 
counterproductive.  
For many Recipient Countries, the existential quandary is how to protect their National or 
Economic Security and financial stability as well as attract the ready capital Sovereign Funds 
provide. This is coming against the backdrop of huge budgetary constraints and massive 
sovereign debt commitments. This Chapter pursues a juxtapositional analysis of the 
existential quandary. It sets up a market-centred investment regime against the policy 
concerns militating against such a regime viz National Security and financial stability. It 
pursues a historical analysis of National Security.  It also highlights the hierarchy of interests 
inherent in sovereign investments; it concedes that there is no fool proof solution to the great 
trade-off between Host countries interests in sustaining the openness of capital markets and 
the contiguous policy concerns present.  It concludes by proffering solutions to arrest the 
existential quandary regulators and policy-makers face.      
 
 
3.1- MARKET-ORIENTED  INVESTMENT vs HOST STATE POLICY CONCERNS 
As has been iteratively observed, there is a nexus between a liberal investment regime and 
economic growth, ie the more capital is provided in a country, the more its absorptive 
capacity increases, leading to a maximisation of productivity, creation of jobs, revenue 
mobilisation and domestic development.87 To put it in more concrete terms, the 2014 World 
Investment report published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
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(UNCTAD) – (JOBS FIGURES UKTI) estimates that inward foreign investments into the 
UK will peak at US $37.1 million, whilst the value of UK inward FDI stock is estimated to 
have increased by 8.3 percent during the last year, reaching a record level of US$1,606 
billion (£975 billion).88 These figures also show that the FDI to GDP ratio in the UK has 
widened by over 3% reaching 63.3%.89  
 On the other side of the Atlantic, the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis puts 
inward investments from foreign firms at $166.4 billion dollars in 2012. Further statistics on 
employment revealed that majority-owned U.S. affiliates of foreign companies employed 5.6 
million people in 2011, up 3.3 percent from the previous year and compared to the 1.8 
percent increase in total U.S. private-industry employment in that year.90  Going back much 
further, Foreign-owned firms re-invested more than 50% of their US income back into the US 
Economy and made 13% of US tax payments in 2006.91 
In these straightened times, when the global financial crisis is slowly easing away and 
recipient countries are reeling from decade-long low saving rates, deficits and debts, the 
benefits of foreign inward Investments cannot be over-emphasised, not least to galvanise 
these economies, finance the burgeoning deficits and get host economies back to pre-crisis 
levels. That said, there are reasons for caution. First, Foreign investments have been known to 
ferment national security risks, where critical industries are acquired for geo-political rather 
than commercial reasons.  Secondly, foreign investments have been linked to financial 
stability concerns. Here it has been averred that the unrestricted influx of foreign capital 
could heat up recipient economies, resulting in boom and bust cycles. Further, it has been 
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averred that the inordinate reliance on foreign capital could lead to instability in the event of a 
serial divestment.92  
Individually and collectively, recipient countries have begun to address these challenges, 
many times citing policy concerns such as National security and Financial Stability. The 
response all too often has been a higher incidence of protectionist, restrictive and xenophobic 
measures less favourable to foreign investments.93 This has precipitated a great trade-off 
between a Liberal investment regime and these policy concerns. One there may not a fool-
proof solution to. These concerns will be broadly analysed in the next paragraph. 
 
3.2- National Security, Sovereign Funds and other related Concerns in Investment 
Regulation: 
In an age of ever-increasing globalisation, governments across the world face a notoriously 
difficult balance between encouraging economically beneficial foreign investments and 
protecting essential security interests. This delicate balance is sometimes seen in investment 
policies where broad and open-ended constructions are adopted which often blur the lines 
between Military and Economic concerns.94 One of such policy concern is National Security. 
Although academic journals and policy papers are replete with interpretations of the term 
National Security, its true meaning in the realm of investment regulation continues to 
confound.  
The term National Security is a nebulous and elusive concept for which an etymology is not 
immediately clear. Its application and appellation varies from country to country. More so, 
there seems to be a ubiquitous presence for National Security and other related terms in 
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Investment treaties between nation-states and Declarations of organisations like the OECD 
and WTO. 
In the realm of Investment Regulation, concerns about the protection of National security 
interests have been sounded repeatedly throughout history, but in retrospect, they have been 
occasionally substantiated. These concerns were arguably first expressed during the World 
Wars, with the enactment of the Trading with the Enemy Act in America and Britain in 1917 
and 1939 respectively95. Years later in the 1960s, European anxiety about American 
investment was widespread, resulting in debates about the advantages afforded to the United 
States by the Bretton-Woods international monetary system and the possibility of economic 
control from the Americans, a scenario that never materialised.96 The I970s was dominated 
by demands for a New International Economic Order; here the concern was that the 
transnational corporations of Developed countries were exploiting poor countries in the 
south. The countries spear-heading this economic revolution wanted an international 
consensus on the regulation of Transnational Corporations in line with the National and 
economic interests of the recipient countries particularly in the African continent.  
Much later in the 70s, the national security fervour again erupted in response to petrodollar 
investments from oil-producing nations in Countries like the United States. This led to 
protracted congressional investigations in the United States which belatedly discovered that 
the said investments were largely from Western Allies and Not Middle-Eastern countries.97 In 
the wake of the 1980’s dollar crunch, Japanese Corporations stashed with ready capital 
sought to purchase American Corporations in strategic industries like defence. An instructive 
flashpoint case was the attempted acquisition of Fairchild (A United States Semi-Conductor 
                                                          
95 John Carroll, Back to the Future: Redefining the Foreign Investment and National Security Act’s Conception 
of National Security (2009) 23 Emory. Int’l. L. Rev 167, 170  
96Jonathan Kirshner, Sovereign Wealth Funds and National Security: The Dog that will Refuse to Bark (2009)  
14(2) Geopolitics 305, 307 
97 Supra N 96 at 169 
46 
 
Manufacturer) by Fujitsu. This changed the terms of the foreign investment debate from fears 
about American competitiveness to fears about National Security driven this time by patent 
populist and xenophobic concerns.98  
The harrowing events of the early noughties combined with the growing presence of state-
backed investors not only sparked changes in Western foreign policy, it became an enforced 
obstacle to the notion of free and unrestrained foreign investment.99 The ensuing response 
was a sullen reinforcement of a long-held fear that the forces of Globalization and 
financialization could unleash rampant market forces that threaten to undermine national 
stability and prosperity; for which states in turn must construct and evolve institutional and 
policy defences. This culminated in a higher incidence of restrictive foreign investment 
measures for which the botched Unocal and Dubai Ports World incidents in the United States 
are smoking guns. Although most of these acquisitions were unsuccessful, they left a 
poisonous narrative, much of which are still in the trail of foreign investors like Sovereign 
Wealth Funds.100  
 Although a Definitional Conundrum besets the term National Security, What is clear is that it 
embodies a set of policy responses aimed at protecting the national, cultural and economic 
well-being of the recipient country as well as its vital interests and industries.101 This has 
resulted in preventative and precautionary measures aimed at sourcing out investment 
dangers and protecting essential security interests. This then poses a pertinent question of 
how one defines a strategic or essential industry. One linked to defence is understandable, 
however in other areas it is more difficult to say. This has given policy makers considerable 
latitude to subsume other interests within the rubric of essential security concerns or national 
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security, leading to topical innovations like the concept of Critical Infrastructure for which a 
broad selection of industries ranging from defence to telecommunications are actively 
policed.  
For the most savage of critics, National Security albeit a legitimate concern for nation states, 
is at risk of becoming a proxy for host countries’ concern about their exceptionality and 
indispensability.102 This narrative feeds into concerns harboured by western nations about the 
tectonic shift in the balance of economic and political hegemony from West to the East which 
coincidentally is home to the biggest Sovereign funds. Also, there appears to be a growing 
unease in Western Capitals about the meteoric rise of state capitalist machines which appear 
to be at variance with the orthodox free market ideology.103 If anything, this has the potential 
to transform the foreign investment regime from a serious process of directional capital flows 
to a mere profiling exercise which may prove counter-productive going forward. It may also 
whip up retaliatory or tit-for-tat policies to restrict investments from protectionist countries as 
we now see in net capital-exporters like China, Russia, Singapore and the Gulf Countries, 
with immeasurable costs for the world investment order. 104  
Before dissecting the National Security concerns ascribed to Sovereign Wealth Funds, it is 
imperative to contextualise these funds and their activities on private Overseas Markets.  
Sovereign Wealth Funds are State sponsored and controlled funds associated with the 
recycling of budget and commodity surpluses into host countries. From home countries 
perspective, these surpluses have the potential to maximise returns, hedge against price and 
economic volatility as well as assert the sovereignty of the sponsoring state.105 Nonetheless, 
SWFs have important domestic macroeconomic and national risks. This is by virtue of their 
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position as managers of scarce public money that could have been spent domestically rather 
than invested abroad. Therefore, from a home state perspective, the design and purposes of 
the SWF can be a source of domestic instability if it does not chime with the homes 
government’s broader macroeconomic objective.106 According to the IMF, poor management 
of funds by home states could create fiscal and monetary policy risks for the home country. 
In the sphere of fiscal risks, losses from Sovereign funds could lead to budgetary 
fragmentation, open up black holes in public sector balance sheets and create resource 
allocation and cash management difficulties. As for monetary policy, funds with the 
discretion to pursue both foreign and domestic investments may create asset price bubbles 
and sterilisation challenges for domestic monetary institutions. This is due to a sizeable shift 
from foreign to domestic assets.107   
From host country perspective, the ready capital provided by SWFs can galvanise recipient 
corporations, create employment for indigenes and stimulate economic growth.  An added 
advantage from SWFs is that they are typically un-leveraged and have the ability to stick 
around much longer than most private portfolio investors in the face of transitory market 
swings. A prime example, being the influx of sovereign capital into cash-strapped western 
institutions like Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Barclays and UBS in the wake of 
the credit and liquidity crisis and the investments into Sovereign bonds and treasury bills in 
this torrid time. This injection augmented the capital buffers of hitherto heroically efficient 
host corporations and salvaged recipient countries108.  
Notwithstanding this benign investment behaviour, there   are deductive risks as well- at least 
in the view of many recipient countries. One issue of immense concern is the possibility that 
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Sovereign Wealth Funds may be used to further the geopolitical aims of their sponsors with 
immeasurable costs to the national or economic security of the recipient state. Here, a whole 
set of motives, some quite alarming, have been ascribed to SWF investments including but 
not limited to: economic sabotage, concealing attempts by foreign governments to obtain 
technology, resources, or expertise to benefit national strategic interests, the asset-stripping of 
recipient corporations, a fast-buck mentality, concentrating ownership of corporations in 
undemocratic hands, obtaining diplomatic and political leverage for sponsoring countries and 
a propensity for corrupt investments.109 These concerns have been aggravated in western 
recipient states by the entry of Russia and china - two nations with obdurate geopolitical and 
foreign policy ambitions into the SWF business as well as the rapid increase in funds from 
undemocratic middle-eastern states. 110  
For some, the incessant demonology of SWFs over strategic motivations or politically biased 
investments are premature and unsubstantiated because SWFs are as conservative in their 
competition for market share as other institutional investors like Mutual and Pension funds 
and rarely take up significant stakes in foreign industries to carry out these nefarious 
allegations. The proponents of this pro-SWF position equally argue that the preponderance of 
evidence suggests that SWF investments in ‘politically-sensitive industries’ while existent, is 
somewhat limited. In fact, SWFs generally eschew high-profile investments which might 
attract unwanted political firestorms.111  
Notwithstanding these firm positions, the opponents from the other side of the SWF debate 
are equally unrelenting. Ian Bremmer sees the mandate of SWFs which includes: financing 
infrastructure development and recapitalising the state sector as functions which may not be 
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insulated from politics.112 In similar vein, Daniel Haberly argues that the developmentalist 
mandate given to many SWFs could mean that they view their investments not only through 
the prism of a corporate shareholder but also from the prism of a national stakeholder i.e  
individual investments are leveraged to build and reinforce specific relationships of 
significance to national interests.113 In this context, he cites the instructive example of the 
openly strategic tactics of Mudabala the Abu Dhabi Sovereign Wealth Fund which in its 2007 
report admitted that its purchase of a 35% stake in Piaggio Aero, an Italian manufacturer of 
private jets, was due to “the opportunity to begin manufacturing aircraft in Abu Dhabi soon”. 
If anything, this network analysis suggests a more widespread strategic dimension to the 
wider investments of Mudabala than is publicly acknowledged.114  
As for politically biased investments, SWF sceptics argue that the tales of the future cannot 
be gleaned from the tea leaves of the past, In effect, a relatively apolitical past is not an 
accurate indicator of future performance. Secondly, they contend that the insulation of 
commercial investments from political considerations is not immediately clear since the line 
between political and financial power has worn perilously thin.115 This position has been 
echoed by Anna Gelpern, who argues that SWFs are part of a new generation in global 
finance where the diverse tributaries of economics, politics and law come in continuous and 
intimate contact116. More trenchantly, Fabio Bassan argues that under the logic of 
globalisation, economics may absorb politics; he further posits that increased dependence 
between countries, however intractable, has bridged the gap between these playing fields.117  
In similar vein, Edwin Truman an eminent scholar of SWFs activities has averred that “even 
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if the actions of an SWF are not motivated by non-economic considerations, non-economic 
motives will read into the SWF decisions just the same.”118  
Whilst the reverse is equally arguable, there have been instances across the board where 
political considerations have permeated or at least threatened to permeate into the commercial 
activities of sovereign funds. For instance, The China Investment Corporation (one of 
China’s bloated funds) has many communist party politicians in sensitive positions. This 
internal structure is likely to lead to a politicisation of investments and further increase 
concerns in host states that Sovereign funds provide an invisibility cloak for direct political or 
governmental intervention in host economies.119 In similar vein, but less perilously, the 
ethical investment policy of Norway’s Sovereign Wealth Fund provides more evidence of the 
amalgam of political and economic motives in Sovereign Fund overseas investments. By 
pursuing such an investment policy, Norway is seeking not merely to project its public wealth 
into private global markets in search of returns; it is also constructing a principled framework 
that blends the imperatives of its public policy.120 
Another misgiving that has arguably prompted the national security response is the fact that 
SWFs as hybrid state capitalist innovations sit uneasily within host states’ regulatory 
paradigm, premised on the existence of an ascertainable boundary between public and private 
capital.121 This boundary had come under enormous strain as the statist and private ways of 
transnational trade converged. Yet, the uneasy dialectic between states and markets prevails. 
Earlier Proponents of free market liberalism contended that it is for markets to own and 
control the means of production, distribution and exchange whilst statist authority is used to 
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either regulate capital mobility or respond to the imperatives of global financial Markets.122 
Interestingly, with Sovereign Wealth Funds, the sponsoring state is not strictly regulating the 
mobility of capital; it has instead become part and parcel of the very structure of capital 
mobility from which it was distinguished in earlier analysis. More so, host state regulators 
faced with the double whammy of losing beneficial sovereign capital and a skirmish with 
desperate domestic corporations have iteratively pointed out the potential for conflicting 
interests given that government ownership of Sovereign Funds makes them both market 
referees and market players123 (Regulator and Regulatee).124 In principle, this has the 
potential to brew up contradictory legal and political demands.  
In sum, Sovereign Funds have been nothing more than stabilising forces in overseas private 
markets yet they are at the epicentre of an international crisis of trust and legitimacy. The 
eccentricities of public ownership and the propensity to seek higher premiums on private 
markets is not only enigmatic; it has become a lightning rod for host state fears over national 
or economic security. Regulators and policymakers haunted by the mistakes of the past have 
found an easy way of making up lost ground, by taking up cudgels against this peculiar type 
of fund that is both public and quasi-private in nature and struggles to fit comfortably into 
neat legal and regulatory boxes.125 The argument has always been that even when SWFs act 
commercially, their sovereign status is not diminished thus decision-making may not be 
insulated from politics. More daunting yet is the reality that these funds are an erosion of the 
distinct roles of states and markets. For many recipient economies the deep-seated fear is not 
just about the peculiarities of this funds, it is also about the nebulous boundaries between 
state apparatus and the market in SWF owner states like Russia and China. This and many 
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other factors have entrapped Sovereign Funds in the shadow of regulation and politics in 
which a vital concern is held up– National Security.  
The burden of proof is on both parties to this quagmire. For Sovereign Funds, adherence to 
the Santiago principles and other codes of best practice is an essential part of the de-
politicisation package.  However, they must do more to assert their political independence 
from sponsoring states. For Regulators, the challenge has never been more daunting, they 
must disentangle rhetoric from reality and find ways to bring about a more proportionate 
balance between the incredibly beneficial capital Sovereign funds bring and the risks they 
exude. The proposals to counter this quandary are analysed below. 
3.3- Financial Stability 
Another prominent feature in policy toolkits is Financial Stability, this is often tied to the 
low-level transparency of SWFs and sometimes suffused within the National/Economic 
security paradigm. Although this has been a long standing concern about foreign investments, 
it has become more integral in the wake of the 2007-2009 juddering halt in market 
confidence. In the context of Sovereign funds, regulators and academics appear petrified by 
the stability risks these funds may bring.  For example, many argue that actual or rumoured 
transactions by opaque funds may affect relative valuations in particular sectors and result in 
herding behaviour from other investors, with mammoth risks to financial institutions. 126 This 
is due to a lack of information, which means that market actors may interpret a fund’s 
withdrawal or purchase of positions as a signal of the long-term viability of the instruments 
involved.127  More so, it is argued that deeper markets like the currency market can be 
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affected at least momentarily by rumours or actual announcement of changes in currency 
allocations by central banks or sovereign wealth funds.128  
According to Sun and Hesse, Market disturbances could ensue if a sovereign fund invests 
through another institutional investor like a hedge fund, that is leveraged or subject to margin 
requirements. This kind of investment strategy it is argued could amplify market changes. 
This is made much worse in a situation where the sovereign fund is less transparent, here, 
market actors may find it difficult to anticipate changes in asset allocations and risk 
preferences, leading to increased volatility. 129 Further, sceptics argue that a divestment or 
repositioning of assets by sovereign wealth funds could in itself create market disturbances.  
However plausible this position appears, it assumes too facilely that the outflow of capital 
through divestments would not be offset by other investors both private and public. Secondly, 
it is instructive to note that the size of SWFs in comparison to other institutional investors is 
derisory, so a serious damage to the market seems inconceivable.130           
 Given the benefit of hindsight, it is worth noting that sovereign funds were one of the few 
market stabilisers in the wake of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. As typically unleveraged 
investors, they injected long-term capital. Whilst private investors suffered from a protracted 
confidence crisis, these funds augmented the buffers of systematically important institutions. 
More benignly, a considerable amount of sovereign funds took the painstaking decision to 
remain during this torrid market swing, with substantial costs to their overall asset value. 
Having investigated the long festering policy concerns of recipient states, and the dilemma 
posed, the panacea lies not in outlining these challenges but in proffering credible and 
workable solutions to them. Below is a set of proposals to resolve the regulatory dilemma.     
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3.4- PROPOSALS TO RESOLVE THE DILEMMA. 
To resolve the existential regulatory quandary, the onus is on both parties. For regulators, the 
starting point is an appreciation of the vortex of mythologies about Sovereign wealth funds 
and to disentangle this rhetoric from reality. One of such regurgitated myth is that of SWF 
homogeneity.131 A corollary of this is that Sovereign Funds require Uniform Standards and 
benchmarks and can all be boxed into one silo. To illustrate, it is right that Sovereign Wealth 
Funds are a distinct investor class. Yet, it is equally right that within this discrete group, there 
is glaring diversity amongst members. For instance, it may not be prudent policy for funds 
dedicated to long-term savings, intergenerational wealth transfer or contingent pension 
reserve accumulation to also have a stabilisation role involving draw-downs to meet fiscal 
needs but for other funds with stabilisation roles, the use of drawdowns may be fiscally, 
politically and economically apposite. Secondly, unlike other institutional investors such as 
pension funds which have a defined beneficiary, SWFs hold assets in the shared interest of 
the community. There is no individual beneficiary. This unique trait sets them apart. But 
given the diverse nature of shared community interests they might serve, the funds share little 
in common operationally to warrants universal policy prescriptions132.  
In the light of the foregoing, it is pertinent for regulatory policy to be sensitive to this context-
dependent diversity.  Regulatory policies must also shed its self-defeating and hasty traits and 
take a longitudinal view of Sovereign Wealth Funds. This involves a recognition by the 
intractable forces that the very reason for a surge in sovereign capital is decades of 
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expansionary policies, low savings, humungous deficits and a confidence and liquidity crisis 
in the private sector for which a protracted period of time and political will is required to 
remedy. 133 Secondly and most importantly, regulators should recognise that Sovereign funds 
are part of a globalisation and financialisation phase where the revolving doors of change and 
interests are in full tilt. In effect, it is deeply inimical to the ideals of globalisation and 
capitalism (which most regulators are wedded to) to wield a big stick towards a certain genus 
of investors because they are colour-coded and not black or white. If anything, such a 
regulatory policy is perverse and theoretically conservative. Thirdly, policymakers should 
indulge in a great deal of introspection on the hypocritical signal sent out by systematically 
erecting trade frontiers and simultaneously calling for the elimination of the same frontiers. 
The period of reflection should also extend to the potential consequences for the global 
economy.      
Although the long festering policy concerns of national security and financial stability are 
genuine and emerging, regulators and policymakers must engage in a cost-benefit analysis of 
the macroeconomic benefits of Sovereign capital vis a vis the risks they exude to ensure an 
equilibrium of interests. IMF and OECD principles of regulatory proportionality and balance 
must be adhered to. More so, a depoliticisation policy in the realms of investment regulation 
is desirable, if not apt, to reassure foreign investors that decisions on market entry are made 
most desirably by technocrats and not politicians and based on purely commercial as opposed 
to political or xenophobic grounds.134 Before going into the proposals proper, it is imperative 
to dissect the perspective of sovereign funds and their constituents to the regulatory quandary.   
The Consensus ad idem is not just for home state regulators and policymakers, there is 
equally a role for Sovereign funds and their constituents. As evidenced in the Santiago 
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principles, Sovereign funds and their managers must do more to assert their independence 
from the politics of their home countries.  This involves pulling out all the stops to insulate 
market activities from the clutches of narrow political interests. This can be achieved by inter 
alia promoting sound institutional governance, embedding robust managerial independence, 
setting out the legal form and structure of the fund and its relationship with other public 
bodies like the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank, setting out the risk appetite of the 
fund and establishing clear division of responsibilities between constituent members.135 
Although recent scorecards on Santiago compliance shows marked improvements in 
disclosure and transparency,136 Sovereign funds must not resile from this significant leap 
towards increased global legitimacy. Instead, managers should disclose more to assuage the 
concerns of investee state regulators and put to bed the crisis of trust and legitimacy 
enveloping their increased global presence. 
 
The proposals outlined below are not and do not pretend to be fool proof solutions to the 
regulatory dilemma. They are merely pieces in a much wider jigsaw of fund regulation.  
For starters, it would be desirable for Sovereign fund investments to be seen as an economic 
governance issue where market principles take pre-eminence with a limited role for 
government. This seems to be the position in Britain where there is the absence of a 
formalised screening or investment restriction process for foreign investments at large. 
Whether this formulae can survive politically expedient calls for reconsideration is not 
immediately clear. What is clear though is that the British economy in a latest survey of 
Sovereign Wealth Managers and Central Banks has been rated the most welcoming economy 
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in the world for foreign public investment.137 This is in sharp contrast with the growing 
disquiet about the hostility of other investment destinations138  
Secondly, Jurisdictions that operate naked protectionist policies against these funds need to 
reconsider their policy positions. But then again, the amorphous nature of the word 
‘protectionism’ makes it difficult to draw the line between protectionism and genuine 
investment restrictions.  
Thirdly, for jurisdictions that operate investment screening or review mechanisms, there is 
need to continue with case by case policing of risks. Where this is not applicable, it should be 
implemented. There is also need to evaluate whether there exists any lines of business which 
consistently pose few national security problems and explicitly exempt these industries from 
review (an example of such industry could be retail). Recipient states should actively 
consider providing exemptions from review processes for SWFs of certain countries in 
exchange for the SWF abiding by sound market practices and measures like the Santiago 
principles. This will undoubtedly incentivise Sovereign Funds to depoliticise themselves. 
Equally, it could populate data repositories with information about Sovereign fund 
investments without the stress of regulatory skirmishes. Receiving such an exemption would 
be cost-efficient for funds as it would cost less to comply with exemption requirements than 
it would to undergo review processes.  Norway’s Sovereign Wealth Fund appears to be a 
prime candidate for such an exemption. First, according to the World CIA Factbook, Norway 
does not have any ongoing conflicts with the United States (an archetypical recipient state) 
that might motivate it to harm the United States if given the opportunity.  The same cannot be 
said of China, Russia and some Gulf states.139 Secondly, the Norwegian fund is known for its 
                                                          
137 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0c91042c-f7a0-11e3-b2cf-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3B5jvKsrC  
138Supra N 79  
139 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Norway, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/no.html#issues   
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scrupulous adherence to principles of transparency and governance. In fact, Score cards on 
Santiago compliance have always extolled the fund as the poster-child for model fund 
behaviour.  
Further, there is need for an accord between home and recipient economies on definitions in 
investment regulation. This includes a fair amount of clarification on the meaning of vital 
terms like National Security, Economic Security, critical infrastructure, essential defence 
interests. The lack of consensus on these terms both in national legislations and multilateral 
instruments is a recipe for discord. The more these terms are illuminated, the less likely that 
Sovereign Wealth funds will hazard investments that may be seen as perilously political.140  
It is dangerously ironic that regulators crowing about poor levels SWF transparency, are 
themselves less transparent. At the moment, investment screening procedures in recipient 
countries are anything but transparent.141 To tackle the great trade-off between Sovereign 
Investments and recipient state policy concerns, regulatory policy must be systematically 
transparent and this should start with investment screening and review procedures. In effect, 
regulators must ensure the presence of a formal calculus on how decisions are taken as well 
as provide adequate guidance on potential red flags. For the most part, the decisions of the 
screening body should be amenable to some form of further review so as to provide redress to 
aggrieved parties. Another proposal to tackle the great trade-off, is the entrenchment of 
reciprocity in Sovereign Fund activities. This could be by way of multilateral and bilateral 
agreements or contracts between owner and recipient states on fair or free movements of 
Sovereign and other capital between the concerned territories. This enforceable commitment 
could incentivize both countries to periodically reappraise the efficacy of FDI limitations 
                                                          
140 Benjamin Cohen, SWFs and National Security: The Great Tradeoff (2008) 85 (4) International Affairs 713, 
729  
141 ibid  
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established in law and regulation as well keep statist investment arms within the confines of 
the agreement.142    
Although these proposals are far from fool proof, they are a set of modest proposals to hedge 
against arbitrariness in review processes and generally tackle the growing gulf between much 
needed sovereign capital and Recipient states’ policy concerns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
142 Supra N 108 
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Conclusion 
This dissertation sought to elaborate on the public money in private markets paradigm. This 
is tied to the increasing apprehension about the rebound of the capitalist state in several 
forms. In earlier analyses, it was established that public institutions like Central banks and 
State Corporations are acquiring significant stakes in markets ranging from equities to 
hydrocarbon. That said, a new class of public investor (Sovereign wealth funds) has emerged 
to recycle public wealth in exchange for risk-adjusted returns. Their nature and structure has 
provoked controversy, so has their propensity to straddle overseas markets in search of 
market share. Much of the concerns raised has proved precipitate, yet recipient state 
regulators are fearing the worst.  The penultimate chapter of the dissertation investigated the 
extant regulatory framework underpinning the investments of SWFs, revealing huge concerns 
of fragmentation, implementation and the entrapment of these funds in the politics of both 
home and recipient states, for which a great deal of coordination both at the domestic and 
multilateral level is needed.  In the last chapter, policy concerns such as National Security 
and Financial Stability were investigated from a historical angle, revealing how long-
festering these concerns are. Yet, it was established that there is the pressing need to 
coordinate these hydra-headed problems of state policy without staunching the mutually 
beneficial flow of sovereign investment. This is even more vital given the terrifying blend of 
a slow global economic recovery, massive sovereign debts and deficits and a private sector 
sapped of confidence. As such, the paper proffered practicable and workable solutions to plug 
the gap. These solutions are by no means fool-proof, yet, they are part of the much wider 
jigsaw of fund regulation. They consist of a consensus ad idem between home and host states, 
within the precincts of existing regulation, but with a great deal of compromise from both 
sides. This will of course start with a genuine step towards greater international legitimacy 
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for SWFs through the Santiago principles on better governance, the insulation of politics 
from investment decisions and more high-level transparency. Further, the state parties 
involved must come up with reciprocal arrangements to tackle the mistrust between 
themselves. Recipient states regulators were tasked to view SWFs as a sect of investors here 
to stay, as well as depoliticise themselves and not fall prey to political hand-wringing.  Also 
established was the need to make concessions where national risks are inconceivable and to 
do so without taking their eyes off the ball.    
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